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 Overview 
This report presents and discusses what evidence exists about initiatives to promote 
transparency among legislators, members of parliament (MPs), and legislative processes and 
what impact this has had on legislative accountability. In this report we distinguish between two 
types of accountability: vertical (in which citizens play a direct role in holding the powerful to 
account) and horizontal (in which legislators hold the executive to account). With regard to 
vertical accountability, the effects of three policy initiatives are reviewed: i) increased information 
about MPs including through ICTs; ii) disclosure of MPs’ assets; and iii) disclosure of MPs’ 
election expenses and funders. Compared to more recent transparency initiatives, such as 
registers of beneficial ownership information, these initiatives have had a few years to generate 
some evidence about impact. In relation to horizontal accountability, the impact of transparency 
on the effectiveness of Public Accounts Committees is reviewed. The choice to focus on this 
Committee was also made on the basis of available research.  
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Concerning transparency’s role in inducing vertical accountability, evidence suggests that: 
▪ Increased information about MPs and their conduct may lead to greater accountability by 
aligning the behaviour of MPs, who want to be elected, with the expectations of voters 
who will electorally punish misconduct. There is, however, mixed evidence for whether 
voters do punish MPs for misconducts at election times.  
▪ Political contextual factors, such as clientelism, can produce vertical accountability that is 
personal in nature and not what we would label as ‘good governance’. In such contexts, it 
is questionable to what degree transparency about MPs’ legislative conduct would induce 
greater accountability.  
▪ There is also a risk coupled with increased transparency about MPs. Evidence shows 
that increased information about MPs’ misconduct and corrupt engagements can lead to 
voter disillusionment and citizens withdrawing from democratic participation. 
▪ Dissemination of information about MPs and parliaments through ICTs has increased in 
recent years but it is unclear what impact this type of transparency has had on 
accountability and MP behaviour.  
▪ The small evidence base concerning asset disclosure shows a potentially positive 
association between publicly disclosed information about MPs’ assets and lower levels of 
corruption. More research is needed to cement these findings and provide further 
evidence on the causal mechanisms underpinning these results. 
▪ While conventional wisdom predicts that more transparency in political finance, including 
public disclosure of MPs’ expenditures and sources of funding, would have positive 
effects on accountability, there is very little empirical evidence supporting this claim. A 
number of potential risks are coupled with increased campaign finance transparency and 
more research is needed to see how the potential benefits and risks of such transparency 
play out in developing country contexts. 
Concerning transparency’s role in inducing horizontal accountability: 
▪ Theory suggest that making oversight a salient political issue by disclosing and 
disseminating information about the work of Public Accounts Committees to the public, 
via media or engaged civil society, may induce a greater sense of urgency among 
Committee members and tilt their incentives towards being more effective in their 
oversight roles. This is supported by some evidence.  
▪ More political economy-focused research on legislative oversight in different developing 
country contexts is needed to further our understanding of how transparency can be used 
to promote horizontal accountability. 
 Transparency for improved vertical accountability 
This section focuses on the role transparency plays for citizens in holding their MPs to account, 
so-called vertical accountability. It looks at some of the kinds of transparency interventions that 
can help improve vertical accountability: information on MPs’ behaviour, including in parliament; 
transparency about MPs’ assets; and transparency provisions in political finance regulations.  
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Providing more information about MPs  
Does increased transparency about MPs have an impact on their behaviour? Theory on vertical 
accountability suggests that transparency (reliable, accessible and timely information) is a key 
mechanism for achieving improved accountability. As voters will punish politicians when they 
have credible information about them shirking their responsibilities or acting corruptly or 
opportunistically, improved transparency should incentivise MPs, who want to get re-elected, to 
meet the expectations of voters. This is referred to as ‘healthy political engagement’ by a recent 
World Bank report, as opposed to ‘unhealthy political engagement’ whereby citizens vote for 
candidates based on promises of patronage or other personalised goods (World Bank, 2016).  
The litmus test for whether transparency with regard to MPs produces accountability is whether 
information about the conduct of MPs ultimately affects citizens’ voting behaviour. Do voters 
punish politicians for bad behaviour? Are there any risks associated with transparency?  
There is some evidence that improved transparency is associated with better behaviour among 
MPs, suggesting that MPs feel incentivised to meet citizens’ expectations. Besley et al (2006) 
found, using household survey data in India, that citizen access to information about politicians 
seems to be associated with greater political accountability. Specifically, they found that low 
quality politicians are more likely to be selected if information about politician quality is limited, 
and that improved information flows in the village reduces political opportunism and improve 
resource allocation. However, the same conclusion cannot be drawn from Banarjee et al’s (2010) 
research on voting in rural India. Providing information about corruption allegations connected 
with political candidates did not result in these candidates losing votes. Only information about 
candidates having been charged with ‘heinous crimes’ (i.e., offenses carrying a sentence of more 
than 5 years), had an effect on their vote share.  
Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2013), using survey data in Brazil, found that the vast majority of 
voters are willing to punish corrupt politicians, regardless of how well they performed as 
politicians, suggesting that specific, credible, and accessible information about MPs will lead 
most voters to punish corrupt politicians at the poll. Ferraz and Finan’s (2008) statistical research 
across local governments in Brazil similarly found evidence for the presence of such vertical 
accountability mechanism. They found that voters will punish corrupt politicians when information 
about corruption practices is publicised, and that the effect is particularly large when the 
disclosure of data about corruption is combined with an active media. The authors conclude that 
electoral accountability can act as a powerful mechanism to align politicians’ actions with voters’ 
preferences. 
Finally, Humphreys and Weinstein’s (2007) research on Uganda, although based on pilot 
research of a small sample, shows some promising effects of transparency on MP behaviour. 
The authors randomised which Ugandan MPs were assigned a scorecard of information 
recording their attendance, participation, legislative initiatives, and contact with their 
constituencies, and looked for association between scorecard holders and participation in 
parliamentary sessions. They found that the treatment groups of MPs that were subjected to the 
scorecards were 50% more likely to participate in subsequent parliamentary sessions, although 
the baseline data had shown no difference in prior participation between the treatment and 
control group of MPs.  
The empirical literature has also highlighted a worrying side effect of transparency about MPs’ 
misconducts; that information about politicians engaged in corruption can lead to voter 
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disillusionment and withdrawal from democratic participation. Akrhede Olsson (2014) analysed 
survey data from across 33 countries and the results suggest that corruption perception among 
voters have a dampening effect on voter turnout. The author concludes that corruption makes 
citizens feel as if they have no influence on politics, when decisions are made corruptly, which in 
turn lowers the propensity to engage in political participation. Bauhr and Grimes’ (2014) cross-
country statistical analysis shows similar results, especially in countries where corruption is 
widespread. The authors conclude that, in settings in which corruption is the modus operandi, 
transparency may give rise to resignation and a withdrawal from political life. Some country 
focused research complement these cross-country findings. For example, Chong et al (2011), 
using experimental research on Mexican municipalities, found that information about candidate 
corruption leads to all candidates, corrupt or not, to lose votes, i.e., that information about 
corruption disengages voters from the political process. The findings of Chong et al (2011) have, 
however, been criticised (see Fox, 2014 footnote 40).   
Context matters 
There are indications that country context has a role to play in the transparency-accountability 
nexus with regard to legislators. Malesky et al (2012) provide compelling evidence that greater 
MP transparency does not necessarily lead to greater MP accountability in authoritarian states, 
and that donors should be weary in pushing the transparency agenda to these settings. Their 
argument is that vertical accountability, with citizens endorsing or punishing MPs based on their 
behaviour, does not work the same way in authoritarian states as it does in democratic countries. 
In the former contexts, MPs are primarily a forum for contained exchange between the 
authoritarian leadership and potential opposition, and not a forum for exchange between MPs 
and citizens. Transparency in such contexts, therefore, prompts different behaviour by MPs. In 
particular, transparency may make MPs more conformist due to fear that public knowledge of 
divisions among policy-makers could create instability.  
The authors run an experiment in the single party state of Vietnam by which they increase the 
transparency (creating individual websites with relevant MP information) of a randomised sample 
of MPs ahead of a legislative session. They found that transparency of MPs was associated with 
curtailed activity in the query sessions, and that MPs with individualised websites avoided 
participating in legislative activities that could embarrass regime leaders. However, these findings 
were later questioned by Anderson (2013) who, using the same data, argues that the evidence of 
such negative effects in the Vietnamese context is either weak or non-existent, and that the 
results from the transparency treatment actually suggest a positive effect of transparency.  
Literature on clientelism and neopatrimonialism in the context of sub-Saharan Africa also provide 
food for thought about the likely impact of improved transparency around MPs’ behaviour in 
parliament. Lindberg’s (2010) research on MPs’ incentives in Ghana shows that their incentives 
are skewed away from producing the kind of vertical accountability whereby MPs are judged by 
their behaviour as legislators. As mentioned earlier, transparency should incentivise MPs to meet 
the expectations of voters. The question is, what are voters’ expectations? Lindberg found that 
ranking first among expectations (both from voters and the party of the aspiring or incumbent 
MP), are demands for personalised, clientelistic goods, such as payment of bills and school fees 
for individual constituent. This is followed by less personalised but equally localised constituency 
development projects, such as roads and schools. Ranking third is constituency representation, 
such as being seen talking during parliament sessions. Ranking as low as fourth and fifth are 
what we typically see as an MP’s job description: legislation and executive oversight. As this 
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research indicates, aligning with the expectations of voters in this context would not necessarily 
produce the kind of vertical accountability we symbolise with good governance.  
Other research from across sub-Saharan Africa shows evidence of clientelist-based voting 
behaviour. Wantchekon (2003) applied an experimental method in the primary elections in Benin 
to test whether voters were more likely to cast their vote based on election promises related to 
the distribution of clientelist goods (such as patronage jobs for constituents or support to the local 
fishermen) or promises related to public goods (such as anti-corruption, poverty eradication or 
industrial policy). The research showed that people were more inclined to vote along clientelist 
lines. Another piece of research by Bratton et al (2012), based on survey data of more than 
23,000 people from across 16 African countries, found that voters attempt to associate 
themselves with prospective winners because they wish to gain access to benefits and to avoid 
retribution after the election. In such contexts it is questionable to what degree more information 
about MPs’ behaviour in parliament will have an impact on voters and MP behaviour alike.  
Transparency through ICT  
A number of studies have looked at transparency of parliaments and MPs through the use of 
ICT. Parliamentary websites can enhance government transparency and citizen awareness by 
allowing citizens to have access to government records, the work of elected representatives, the 
policy platforms of different parties and candidates, and the transcripts of parliamentary debates. 
This information can help citizens hold parliament and MPs to account. Transparency of actual 
MP characteristics (personal information) can likewise enhance the quality of governance by 
increasing public awareness, legitimacy and trust in both parliament and individual MPs as 
citizens tend to trust government officials who are accessible and transparent (Joshi and 
Rosenfield, 2013).   
Almost every parliament in the world now has a functioning website. Joshi and Rosenfield (2013) 
provide a descriptive snapshot of MP transparency online. They found that there has been a 
considerable proliferation of parliamentary websites, especially in Asian and African countries, in 
the past decade with a total of 184 countries (out of 193 investigated) now having an active and 
functioning parliamentary website. These websites provide information about MPs although the 
type and extent of information vary widely. This finding is echoed by the latest World e-
Parliament Report by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2016), which, while pointing out that some 
countries are lagging behind due to limited capacity, resources and political will, states that 
parliaments in general have become more open and outward looking.   
Joshi and Rosenfield (2013) also found that less than half of the websites provide contact 
information for individual MPs, which make citizen-MP contact more difficult in those countries. 
Also, only about one in five of these websites have social media links (Facebook, Twitter etc.). 
Social media links were usually found in relatively rich and democratic countries although some 
exceptions to this rule were found, for example from Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. The use of 
social media by parliaments appears to have increased since that research was undertaken, 
according to the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2016). However, Leston-Bandeira and Bender’s 
(2013) study of parliaments’ use of social media shows that parliaments are using social media 
mainly to report parliamentary business, interacting with citizens only on the margins. In terms of 
potential impact on accountability, the study concludes that, to a large extent, parliaments have 
joined social media because they have to; it is an unavoidable tool of communication in today’s 
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society. This does not mean, however, that it has changed much about how parliaments operate 
or led to substantive engagement.  
There are several online databases that complement parliamentary websites and provide 
information about MPs and their behaviour. Based on the model offered by the TheyWorkForYou 
website in the UK – which was launched in 2004 and scrapes and repackages open data from 
official sources – other versions of MP information databases are now available and are being 
used across the world. YourNextRepresentative website by mySociety uses members of the 
public, through crowdsourcing, to obtain and display information about politicians. It was first 
used in the UK’s 2015 election and has since been used in connection with elections in Argentina 
and Costa Rica. Another recent international database on political figures is the EveryPolitician 
website, also by mySociety. It collates data from multiple online sources into a single collection 
and has thus far collected information on almost 73,000 politicians from 233 countries and 
territories.  
While the two latter websites are too recent to have prompted any impact analysis, the impact of 
TheyWorkForYou has recently been analysed as part of a series of impact studies on open data 
by the Open Data Institute. The findings from this case study, mainly based on interviews, 
suggest the that greatest impact of TheyWorkForYou concerns MPs behaviour; that MPs have 
changed the way they go about their work in response to TheyWorkForYou’s vote monitoring and 
analysis tools, both by turning up for more votes and rebelling against their party more often 
(Hogge, 2016). 
Knowledge gaps and suggestions for further research 
The literature and arguments presented in this section show that the often implied transparency-
accountability nexus is far from straight forward when it comes to legislators. More research is 
needed, in particular on the role context plays; its effects on the incentives facing MPs and voters 
alike, and how these incentives are in turn affected by transparency. Databases, such as 
TheyWorkForYou, may also hold scope for more rigorous research on the impact of MP 
transparency. 
Transparency and disclosure of MPs’ assets  
Asset disclosure – by which public officials (or categories thereof) declare their wealth and assets 
– have been put in place to prevent corruption in 161 countries around the world. Asset 
disclosure as a tool to combat corruption has found its way onto the political agenda of several 
inter-governmental platforms. It features in the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) from 
2003 (Article 8 (5)) to which 140 countries are signatories, and which make these countries 
obliged to include provisions on asset disclosure in their national laws. The G20 agreed on a set 
of High-Level Principles on asset disclosure by public officials at the 2012 summit in Los Cabos, 
Mexico (G20, 2012). The Open Government Partnership (OGP) uses the availability of an asset 
disclosure regime as an eligibility criterion for joining the OGP. Four points are awarded to 
countries with a law requiring asset disclosure to be accessible to the public, two points are 
awarded to countries with a law requiring assets to be disclosed, and zero points are awarded to 
countries with no law on asset disclosure.  
Since the launch of the OGP in 2011, a number of countries have made commitments in their 
National Action Plans to improve their asset disclosure systems. Several countries, including 
Armenia, Chile, Croatia, El Salvador, Mongolia, Ukraine, have committed to improving the 
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disclosure of asset information, including publishing asset data online for public consumption. 
That said, other policy inventions with similar purpose as asset disclosure, i.e., beneficial 
ownership registers and registers for buying property, seem to dominate the most recent policy 
discussion judging from the country commitments made at the London Anti-Corruption Summit in 
2016 (Murphy and Raymond, 2016). 
The role of asset disclosure in preventing and fighting corruption is threefold. First, the 
declarations generate baseline information against which later disclosure can be compared to 
identify which wealth is not attributable to licit income and raise the flag for potential illicit 
enrichment. Second, asset disclosure has an investigative function as detection of false and 
misleading declarations can be easier to prove than proving that bribery and other corruption has 
taken place. Third, asset disclosure regimes can also restore public confidence in the 
government by demonstrating that most public officials live within their means and, relatedly, 
protect officials’ reputation from undue allegations of corruption (Chêne, 2008).  
Despite the surge in policy with regard to asset disclosure, the evidence base for disclosure is 
very small. A few World Bank and OECD flagships on how to establish effective asset disclosure 
regimes, as opposed to providing evidence on impact from such regimes, seem to dominate this 
literature (OECD, 2011; World Bank, 2013; Rossi et al, 2017). As this report concerns 
transparency the rest of the section will focus on public disclosure of politician’s asset and 
income information.  
The role of transparency 
There are a number of arguments as to why public official’s asset and financial information 
should be made public. As with other transparency initiatives, public availability of officials’ asset 
declarations can reinforce scrutiny by adding an endless number of eyes, including media and 
civil society organisations that can double-check the information and signal any discrepancy 
between disclosed information and what can be directly observed. Increasing the number of eyes 
watching can be an additional deterrent to wrongdoing as it increases the likelihood of being 
caught. Finally, public scrutiny can also raise the stakes for the disclosure agency.  
There are also arguments against public disclosure of asset declarations. One such argument is 
that otherwise apt people will refrain from entering into public office due to the invasion of privacy 
that is coupled with publicly available asset declarations. The other argument against public 
disclosure concerns the safety of public officials and their families as the wealth information may 
be used to inform ransom demands in areas where kidnappings are common (Rossi et al, 2017).  
Three high quality empirical studies, all based on cross-country statistical analysis, constitute the 
evidence base for asset disclosure. Two of these papers focuses on MPs while the third does not 
distinguish between MPs and other public officials. Moreover, only one of the papers touches 
specifically on the transparency of asset declarations.  
Djanokov et al (2010), using information about rules and practices of disclosure by MPs in 175 
countries, found that public disclosure of MPs’ asset declarations, but not internal and 
confidential disclosure, is positively associated with government quality and lower levels of 
corruption. This finding points to the importance of external control of MPs for good governance. 
The authors conclude that, while the privacy of politicians may have benefits, those may come at 
the cost of lower accountability. Another study by Vargas and Schlutz (2016) measures the 
association between the introduction of substantial financial disclosure systems and corruption 
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levels for 91 countries between 1996 and 2012. Their findings indicate that the introduction of 
officials’ financial disclosure have a positive but lagged impact on countries’ ability to control 
corruption, i.e., the result from the intervention comes only after a few years. These are, 
however, small effects and the authors conclude that policy makers will struggle to register 
success in their fight against corruption if they rely solely on introducing an asset disclosure 
regime. However, this study does not look specifically at the impact of public disclosure of asset 
declarations. Lastly, research by van Aaken and Voigt (2011) looks closer at the 
counterarguments for opening up asset disclosure to the public; that it would act as a 
disincentive for businesspersons and members of other professions to run for parliament. They 
found that the introduction of substantial disclosure rules did not lead to a lower percentage of 
people from business or the law profession in 79 of the included parliaments. Only in four 
parliaments was such a reduction observed.  
Knowledge gaps and suggestions for further research 
This research, while limited, points to positive impact from improving the transparency of the 
assets and income of MPs and other public officials. However, the evidence base could greatly 
benefit from deeper insights about causal mechanisms between transparency of MPs’ asset 
information and accountability (reduced corruption), which could be ascertained through more 
qualitative and case study based research. One case that has the potential to inform about 
impact of asset disclosure transparency is the extensive online database of public officials’ asset 
declaration that has been set up in Georgia, and which was the 2013 winner of the UN Public 
Service Awards for its excellence in preventing corruption. 
Transparency provisions in political finance regulations  
Transparent funding of parties and candidates is part of political finance (or campaign finance) 
regulations in the majority of countries across the world and is called for in international law 
under UNCAC (article 7(3)). Recently assembled indicators on campaign finance from 54 
countries across the world confirm that the vast majority of political finance regulations do include 
transparency provisions in terms of public disclosure of information about candidate and party 
contributions and campaign expenditure (exceptions to this rule are found mainly in Africa and 
Asia).  
What the evidence shows, however, is a gap between what is instituted in law and how effective 
these regulations are in practice. It shows that citizens are, despite regulation in place, regularly 
denied easy access to credible, timely information on the financial activities of relevant political 
actors, limiting the extent to which the public, the media, and civil society are able to enforce 
norms of accountability. In fact, the effective implementation of disclosure requirements is quite 
rare: in practice, of the 54 countries in the sample, only Australia and the United States make all 
relevant financial information freely available online in machine readable formats. Of the rest, 22 
countries meaningfully disclose at least some information, though disclosure is marred by long 
waiting periods, lack of machine-readable formats, or incompleteness of the publicly available 
data. Thirty countries make little or no information available to the public (Global Integrity, 2014).  
In addition to a gap between regulation and implementation, recent research by Westminster 
Foundation for Democracy shows that campaign finance regulations capture only a small part of 
the political costs associated with being an MP in many developing countries. This suggests that 
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information about donations and spending across the entire election cycle is needed to get a 
holistic picture of MPs’ incentives and behaviour (Wardle, 2016).  
The role of transparency 
Public disclosure of campaign finance information has two main purposes: to prevent corruption, 
vote buying and undue influence by political donors, and to gain and maintain citizens’ trust in 
politics. In terms of corruption prevention, the fear of scandals and of losing public support can 
serve as a better defence against misbehaviour than any legal sanctions. Reporting 
requirements also makes it easier for those responsible for enforcing campaign finance 
regulations to oversee whether these rules are being followed. While violators cannot be 
expected to admit to infringements in their reports, requiring them to provide financial accounts 
provides a paper trail that can assist further investigations (IDEA, 2014). Johnston (2005) offers 
another observation on the effectiveness of disclosure, arguing that the notion that citizens will 
fold finance data into their own voting and contribution decisions assumes a level of trust and 
sophistication that may not hold true in practice. Instead, the disclosure of data will likely lead to 
more accountability only if civil society groups and the press can put the data to use. 
Investigative journalists have an important role to play in using and making sense of such data. A 
recent World Bank report on transparency and citizen engagement concludes in a similar way, 
that information by itself will not lead to improving accountability. Instead, the information 
provided through transparency must be specific about both policy actions and the resulting 
outcomes, so that citizens can use this information to select and sanction leaders (World Bank, 
2016).  
Whereas political finance disclosure enjoys widespread acceptance as an anticorruption 
measure – “sunlight is the best disinfectant” – there is an evident gap in the literature in terms of 
empirical evidence concerning the impact of such disclosure, both in terms of comparative, 
cross-country research and country case studies or other more qualitative approaches. The little 
evidence that exists come from the United States (seeing that strict disclosure rules have been 
instituted in that country), and this literature does not paint a coherent picture of the impact of 
political finance transparency.   
A number of risks concerning public disclosure of political finance information have been 
acknowledged in the literature. La Raja (2014), using statistical analysis based on data from the 
United States has found that disclosure of information about political donations has the 
unintended consequence of discouraging smaller donors from donating money to political 
candidates. People either donate less than the limit for disclosure or refrain from donating at all, 
especially if they hold a political minority view within their social context.  
A recent case study, also from the United States, shows how disclosed information can be 
abused with potential risk to political donors. In 2008, voters in California were presented with a 
choice regarding the legal right of same-sex couples to marry: Proposition 8, which passed and 
made same-sex marriage illegal in the state. In 2009, Eightmaps.com was anonymously 
launched, providing detailed information on supporters of Proposition 8. The site collected 
information made public through state campaign finance disclosure laws and overlaid that 
information onto a Google map of the state. Through Eightmaps, users could find the names, 
approximate locations, amount donated, and, where available, employers of individuals who 
donated money to support Proposition 8. This abuse of political finance data seriously infringed 
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on donors’ privacy and many donors experienced threats, vandalism, intimidation and property 
destruction as a consequence (Graft et al, 2016).  
It is easy to imagine how the unintended consequences of disclosure could play out in less 
democratic countries. For example, in countries based on clientelism, where MPs distribute 
personalised goods to their followers, it could be detrimental for people and businesses to openly 
admit support for opposition candidates and parties (Debrah, 2015).  
Knowledge gaps and suggestions for further research 
The combination of a weak evidence base in favour of transparency and disclosure of political 
finance information and the acknowledgement of a number of risks associated with such 
disclosure prompts a request for more research on this subject; with room for both cross-country 
comparative research and country-based research on the impact of disclosure. In particular, 
more research is needed to get a better picture of whether the benefits of public disclosure of 
political finance information outweigh the potential risks in different developing country contexts. 
 Transparency for improved horizontal accountability  
This section focuses on the role transparency plays for MPs in holding the executive branch to 
account, so-called horizontal accountability. The horizontal accountability mechanism 
emphasises the separation of power in a state, and typical institutions of horizontal accountability 
include legislative committees that question governments about their actions, and have the 
power to hold them accountable by initiating a vote of no-confidence (Lindberg et al, 2017). This 
section looks at one such legislative committee, Public Accounts Committees (PACs), and the 
impact transparency and accountability interventions can have for enhancing legislative financial 
accountability. It zeros in on how transparency can shape the effectiveness of oversight 
conducted by members of PACs, and as such, comes back to the assumptions presented in the 
previous section: that disclosure of information combined with the uptake of this information 
shape the incentives of MPs in favour of greater accountability.   
Transparency in legislative financial oversight  
Public Accounts Committees examine the effectiveness of policy implementation, results, and 
value for money. Through examining the work undertaken by the Supreme Audit Institutions 
PACs can also find discrepancies and evidence of wrongdoing and corruption for which they can 
initiate disciplinary and legal action. By doing so, PACs can make a significant contribution to 
ensuring the proper use of resources and reduce corruption (Pelizzo, 2017).  
However, research has shown that PACs do not necessarily provide effective enough oversight 
to contribute to enhanced accountability. Members of PACs can be persuaded to turn a blind eye 
to malfeasance. Lindberg (2010), for example, describes how, in the case of Ghana, MPs who 
show loyalty to the president are rewarded by lucrative seats on procurement and tender boards 
and with cabinet positions. Disloyalty, on the other hand, is punished. Similarly, in Uganda, 
Golooba-Mutebi (2016) found that MPs often ask the president for financial assistance, which 
compromises their role of holding the executive to account.   
Pelizzo and Kinyondo (2014) found in their research on 11 Eastern and Southern African 
countries that the executive branch often undermines the PAC by choosing to ignore 
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recommendations and opinions expressed by the Committee. The frustration is added to by the 
fact that culprits identified by PACs in the region are rarely prosecuted. PACs’ work can be 
undermined in other ways too. Whereas legislative scrutiny and oversight throughout the budget 
cycle require comprehensive, accurate, appropriate and timely information to be supplied by the 
executive (Wehner, 2007); in some cases, PACs do not have access to information about 
expenditure because it has been classified by government. In other cases, there are such large 
discrepancies between approved and actual budgets that the official budgets that PACs work 
with are meaningless (APPG, 2008). 
The role of transparency 
Where PACs have been compromised in their oversight role; what can be done, and does 
improved transparency feature in the solution? According to Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2014), it is 
all about inducing the right incentives to PAC members. Inefficient PACs is a sign that MPs 
believe that the costs associated with being effective overseers greatly outweigh the benefits, 
and no matter how much capacity training or resources they receive they will refrain from using 
their existent tools to exercise effective oversight. Instead, when legislators believe they might 
derive a benefit from effectively performing an oversight activity, they have the political will to 
become effective overseers. There needs to be a popular demand for oversight with voters 
electorally rewarding MPs who perform this role effectively and which, in turn, leads self-
interested members of PACs to perform more effective oversight.  
If this proposition is correct, transparency initiatives can do a lot in spurring demand for oversight 
and thereby changing the incentives felt by members of PACs. Evidence from Ghana by Betley 
et al (2012) suggests that opening up PAC hearings by various means, including televised 
broadcasts, forms an important part of the accountability cycle. The authors noted that the 
televised hearings had, in particular, created pressure on the PAC to increase its functional 
capabilities and improve the quality and timeliness of its scrutiny of audit reports. Similarly, Wang 
and Rakner (2005) suggest that in Uganda opening PAC sessions to the press and other public 
officials has improved the PAC’s ability to hold the executive to account. Finally, Norad’s (2011) 
anti-corruption evaluation of Tanzania suggests that parliamentary oversight was improved by 
institutionalising public hearings during committee sessions, and by PAC reports being made 
available to the public and debated in parliament. 
Knowledge gaps and suggestions for further research 
The literature on PACs and legislative oversight provides us with an inkling that transparency 
initiatives can have an impact on PACs and their ability to perform effective horizontal 
accountability. More in-depth and contextualised political economy studies with a focus on the 
political factors around the effectiveness of legislative oversight would help cement these 
insights. To inquire into whether the capacity building programmes conducted by international 
donors actually improve PACs’ ability to effectively oversee the executive it would be beneficial to 
conduct studies with material from donor interventions that have been undertaken to support 
PACs. As argued by Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2014, p. 260): “The issue that practitioners and 
international organisations need to tackle is not how many oversight tools a legislature has or 
how many more oversight tools a legislature should be given, but is instead how to make sure 
that legislatures use the tools that are placed at their disposal and use them effectively.” 
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